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Abstract The aim of this paper is to show, contra the right-libertarian critique 
of social justice, that there are good reasons for defending policies of social 
justice within a free society. In the first part of the paper, we will present two 
influential right-libertarian critiques of social justice, found in Friedrich Hayek’s 
Law, Legislation and Liberty and Robert Nozick’s Anarchy, State and Utopia. Based 
on their approach, policies of social justice are seen as an unjustified infringement 
on freedoms of individual members of a society. In response to this critique, we 
will introduce the distincion between formal and factual freedom and argue that 
the formal principle of freedom defended by Hayek and Nozick does not suffice 
for the protection of factual freedom of members of a society, because it does 
not recognize (1) the moral obligation to help those who, without their fault, lack 
factual freedom to a significant degree, and (2) the legal obligation of the state 
to protect civic dignity of all members of a society. In the second part of the 
paper, we offer an interpretation of Kant’s argument on taxation, according to 
which civic dignity presupposes factual freedom, in order to argue that Kant’s 
justification of taxation offers good reasons for claiming that the state has the 
legal obligation to protect factual freedom via the policies of social justice.
Keywords: social justice, social policy, taxation, freedom, dignity, Hayek, Nozick, 
Kant
Should a society enforce policies of social justice and on what grounds? We 
will deal with this problem by presenting two influential right-libertarian 
arguments against the policies of social justice and against the very mean-
ingfulness of social justice – arguments offered by Friedrich Hayek and Rob-
ert Nozick. We will argue that their critique is based on what they claim to 
be the grounding principle of a legitimate social order – which we will call 
the formal principle of freedom. In response to their critique we will sug-
gest that, in order to justify policies of social justice, such as taxation, social 
minimum, social housing, universal health care, public education, unemploy-
ment benefits, gender justice and similar policies aimed at greater equality 
among members of a society, we need a more robust concept of freedom. 
This will lead us to propose a difference between formal freedom on the one 
hand and factual freedom on the other hand, in order to show why we be-
lieve that social justice indeed has a meaning and what we see as the main 
elements constituting its meaningfulness. As we intend to show, justifying 
social justice requires attributing value to another principle: the principle 
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of factual freedom, i.e. the principle of respect for human life and dignity. 
Moreover, the principle of factual freedom can be understood not only in 
the ethical sense of governing individual behaviour, but has an important 
legal dimension as well. In the second part of the paper we will discuss the 
latter via Kant’s argument on taxation which, as we will argue, rests upon 
an implicit defence of factual freedom, and thus can help us respond to the 
right-libertarian critique of social justice.
The issues revolving around the concept of social justice that we will discuss 
emerge in the context of the aftermath of the Second World War, The Cold 
War, and the problems of planned economies. Hayek’s and Nozick’s critiques 
presented here are mainly directed at the socialist planned economies and 
Keynesian economics, which was the dominant economic model from the 
later part of the Great Depression until the 1970s. Both sources of which we 
make use, Nozick’s Anarchy, State and Utopia, as well as Hayek’s Law Legis-
lation and Liberty were published in the 1970s, the years which saw first the 
economic recession and then the general acceptance of neoliberal policies 
and neoliberal economic theories (with Hayek as one of their main propo-
nents), as well as libertarian political ideals Nozick influentially advanced. 
Arguments against social justice discussed here should therefore be seen as 
contributing to the arguments against state planning of the economy and as 
an attempt to limit government intervention in the society. We begin with a 
presentation of Hayek’s and Nozick’s critique of social justice.
Critiques of Social Justice
Hayek’s Four Arguments
When discussing Hayek’s critique of social justice we can distinguish four 
interrelated key arguments: the ontological, the epistemological, the eco-
nomic and the political argument. 
The ontological argument is in fact the argument for social justice as a mean-
ingless concept. The argument is called ontological because it reflects the 
ontological view of society as comprised of individuals and rejects the idea 
that there is a social entity with its own collective will. Only individuals with 
their individual wills exist. Our societies, says Hayek, are ordered, we have 
laws, institutions, customs, and we respect certain rules. We tend to under-
stand this order as produced by somebody’s deliberate design (whether it is 
a particular person, or a group of persons, an institution, or a class). Howev-
er, this is not always the case. In fact, social order can, and in very complex 
societies most of the time does arise spontaneously, out of many descrete 
actions of many individuals which are mutually ignorant of any overarching 
goal or the entirety of the process. (Hayek 2013: 34–50) Out of this Hayek 
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derives his critique of social justice. For Hayek, only distributions that have 
been deliberately brought about can be called just or unjust. The term ‘justice’ 
has meaning only within the domain of deliberate actions. Unequal distribu-
tion of wealth produced by the “impersonal process of the market” cannot 
be called unjust, because it was not intentionally produced. When we attri-
bute justice or injustice to the market, we mistakely transfer our experinece 
of personal face-to-face relationships to a realm where this is inapplicable. 
(Hayek 2013: 231–234, Tebble 2009: 583–585)
The second, epistemological argument states that if we attempt to create and 
preserve a just distibution in our society, we are faced with an insurmount-
able difficulty. Namely, we cannot predict the outcome of our actions, be-
cause there is too many factors in play. Market does not operate according 
to a deliberate plan and its outcomes are unpredictable. Deciding how to 
distribute resources based on some non-market criterion, such as people’s 
needs or equality, will necessarily be flawed, because people’s needs and in-
tentions are many and changing, they are individual and impossible to cal-
culate. They are in fact best reflected by the price of goods in the free market 
and the best way to manage them is to let people decide by themselves about 
their needs. (Hayek 2013: 250–253, Tebble 2009: 586–588)
Furthermore, according to Hayek, economically speaking it is more pros-
perous not to intervene in the market. Interventions are dangerous for the 
economy because they disturb the natural system of prices, which are only 
capable of giving us accurate information about supply and demand, enabling 
us to make good economic decisions. Moreover, economic inequality is so-
cially necessary. The market only functions properly “at the price of a con-
stant dissapointment of some expectations”. (Hayek 2013: 267) This is the 
value of free competition for Hayek. It makes all the economic agents, both 
the successful and the unsuccessful ones, learn from the process, develop 
their skills, adjust and innovate. It is through such dispersion of knowledge 
that society can prosper.
Last but not least, social justice endangers individual freedom by putting 
too much power in the hands of the government.  Prices “lose the guiding 
function they have in the market order and would have to be replaced by 
the commands of the directing authority.” (Hayek 2013: 245) “No less than 
in the market order, would the individuals in the common interest have to 
submit to great inequality – only these inequalities would be determined not 
by the interaction of individual skills in an impersonal process, but by the 
uncontradictable decision of authority”. (Hayek 2013: 245) The pursuit of 
social justice “must progressively approach nearer and nearer to a totalitar-
ian system”. (Hayek 2013: 232) Instead of this futile attempt at creating a so-
ciety of social justice, Hayek argues, the state should provide the framework 
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for the free market, i.e. it should provide the set of formal conditions for the 
free competition in the market to take place.
However, it is worth mentioning that Hayek ultimately defends the state 
provision of the economic minimum. In the end, he conceded that there is 
no reason to reject the minimal income safety net in a free society, as long 
as we find some outside-of-market mechanisms for this. (Hayek 2013: 249). 
What does this mean though is not completely clear, because redistribution 
always involves at least via taxation, some sort of intervention in the market. 
This concession actually made his theory vulnerable to attacks, because it 
contradicts his earlier arguments against social justice (Tebble 2009). It shows 
perhaps that contrary to everything previously said, Hayek was aware that 
in a free society some role should still be left for social justice.
Nozick’s Entitlement Theory
Nozick gives us some similar arguments as Hayek. He too accepts sponta-
neous order explanation and uses it to argue that the main aim of the state 
should be the protection of individuals against infringements on their free-
dom. The infringements involve use of violence, coercion, murder, theft, 
fraud, etc. Any more extensive state is unjustified because it violates indi-
vidual rights of its citizens. Whereas Hayek’s arguments are more episte-
mologically based (Hayek argues that we don’t know what others need, we 
don’t know what possible ill effects our actions could have on the market, 
so it’s best to leave the market to function on its own), Nozick’s arguments 
are based on the theory of natural rights. This allows him to make an even 
stronger case for inappropriateness of state intervention and redistribution, 
because in order to rectify inequalities, the state would infringe upon private 
property rights of individuals.  
Social justice is about redistribution. It is about taking away from the wealth-
ier and giving to those who are less fortunate. Nozick argues that this is not 
morally justified because every person should be guaranteed the right to de-
cide on his or her property.
To support this claim he develops the entitlement theory of justice. We will 
quote Nozick’s summary of his theory: “the holdings of a person are just if 
he is entitled to them by the principles of justice in acquisition and transfer 
or by the principle of recification of injustice.” (Nozick 1974: 153) These two 
principles, of acquisition and transfer basically state that if a person aquires 
property in a morally permissible, lawful, just way (whatever this is, is rather 
complex and depends on the context), he or she is entitled to that property. 
The same goes if that property is transferred in a morally permissible, law-
ful and just way to another person. “Entire distribution is just if everybody 
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is entitled to the holdings they posses under the distribution.” (Nozick 1974: 
151) And: “Whatever arises from a just situation by just steps is itself just.” 
(Nozick 1974: 151)
Nozick argues that it is important to take into account how a particular dis-
tribution came about, that is, whether a person acquired a holding in a just 
way and is therefore entitled to it, rather than simply looking at the distri-
bution at a given time and judging that it is just or unjust based on the dis-
tribution itself. For example, if somebody judges that it is not just that so 
many people are starving, while a minority is extremely wealthy in a given 
society, that would be an ahistorical approach to justice and for Nozick the 
judgement would be flawed as long as it does not take into account the his-
tory of the acquisition. (Nozick 1974: 153–155)
Moreover, Nozick labels his entitlement theory as non-patterned, which 
means that the just distribution is not generated by some sort of decision on 
who and based on which characteristics should get what, but by a set of for-
mal principles, formal rules in the game of just acquisition and just transfer.
Nozick gives a vivid and concrete example of his views in describing a hy-
pothetical case involving a very successful basketball player at the time, Wilt 
Chamberlain. (Nozick 1974: 161–163) Nozick says let us start with any dis-
tribution that you consider just, let it be for example, that everyone has an 
equal share of wealth. Now, Wilt Chamberlain attracts audience, everybody 
loves to see him play, because he is so good, and various basketball teams 
compete to have him on their team, and so on. He decides to sign a contract 
with his basketball team, whereby he will get 25 cents out of every sold tick-
et. Everybody is ready to pay the price but in the end Wilt Chamberlain will 
have 25 000 dollars more. The distribution of wealth will become unequal. 
Where did everything go wrong? Nozick says, nowhere, Wilt is entitled to 
his money because no injustice has been done to anyone during the trans-
fer, everybody willingly agreed to give him one small portion of what they 
have in exchange for the pleasure of seeing him play. 
What this argument is meant to show is that any distribution of wealth in a 
free society will be unequal. If we allow people to freely exchange their hold-
ings, we will inevitably end up with an unequal distribution. If we want to 
keep the distribution equal we would have to constantly interfere with peo-
ple’s lives. (Nozick 1974: 163)  
Finally, why we shouldn’t stop this from happening, why not simply stop the 
free exchange, is because it would be immoral. It would interfere with indi-
vidual property rights, the rights to choose what we want to do with what 
we have. The basic fact of morality is that everybody should be allowed to 
live his or her life the way he or she wants, as long as they don’t hurt anybody 
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else. Nozick is radical in endorsing this principle, so much so that for him 
taxation is the same as forced labour, because it forces us to do unrewarded 
work for others. (Nozick 1974: 172)
Should we say that for Nozick social justice is meaningless? The weight of 
Nozick’s argument does not rely primarily on social justice being meaning-
less concept. However, it deprives social justice of its moral meaning. This 
effectively makes demands for social justice meaningless, because they rely 
on the premise that social justice is a morally desirable goal. 
* * *
From these arguments we can derive the main principle both Nozick and 
Hayek see as the principle that every legitimate social order must respect. 
They did not invent this principle. It is the very same principle we find in 
Adam Smith, John Locke, John Stuart Mill and other classical liberals. It rep-
resents the social ideal of individual independence and liberty. It respects 
as the basic moral fact that everybody has their own life and should have 
freedom to decide on what makes their life valuable. In the words of John 
Stuart Mill: “The only purpose for which power can rightfully be exercised 
over any member of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent 
harm to others.” (Mill 2003: 80) The free society is the society which fulfills 
this condition.
The freedom established by this principle is identical with what Isaiah Ber-
lin calls negative freedom, freedom from infringement. “I am normally said 
to be free to the degree to which no man or body of men interferes with my 
activity. If I am prevented by others from doing what I could otherwise do, 
I am to that degree unfree.” (Berlin 2002: 169) We named this principle the 
formal principle of freedom, because it fixes only the necessary formal con-
dition of freedom, but not the sufficient conditions of factual freedom. The 
latter include all the possibilities open to me and all those closed to me based 
on the concrete, material circumstances of my life and the society I live in. 
It is the factual, not the formal freedom that we experience in our everyday 
lives. We experience freedom and unfreedom in relation to certain concrete 
possibilities that we have or don’t have. Most of the time, such experience is 
linked to the resources that we have or don’t have, and to the concrete pow-
er relations in our society. Resources have an important influence on the 
factual freedom, because they greatly determine how much power we will 
have to change circumstances that are unfavourable to us.1
1  The term ‘factual freedom’ is also used in order to defend social constitutional rights 
by Robert Alexy. See Alexy 2002: 337–348.
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The formal principle of freedom does not suffice for the protection of factual 
freedom of members of a society, because it does not recognize (1) the mor-
al obligation to help those who, without their fault, lack factual freedom to 
a significant degree, and (2) the legal obligation of the state to protect civic 
dignity of all members of a society.
The formal principle of freedom does not recognize (1) because it only pro-
tects individual freedom from infringement. Therefore, if I choose not to 
help somebody in danger crying out for help, even if helping would not rep-
resent any significant risk for me, I am not morally responsible, according 
solely to the formal principle of freedom. In a similar way, although taxes 
could be used to help the less fortunate members of a society and guarantee 
to them a degree of factual freedom necessary for living a dignified life (and 
not just mere subsistence), Nozick could still say that they are infringement 
on rights of those who have to pay taxes. In the case of conflict which one 
should we choose? If we wish to keep the moral obligation to help intact, we 
need another principle, the one that would protect factual freedom as well. 
However, we cannot prove that this is a desirable moral goal for everyone. 
Nozick could still argue that private property rights are more basic moral 
rights. We need another argument in order to show that, irrespectively of 
what we individually believe to be morally valuable, the state is somehow 
legally obliged to ensure some amount of social justice. 
In response, we wish to stress the importance of another principle govern-
ing social life: respect for human life and dignity. We intend to show that 
this principle requires not only respect for the formal principle of freedom, 
but also an increase in the factual freedom of all members of a society, given 
that the factual, not the formal freedom is the sufficient condition for living 
a dignified life, because it presupposes having a concrete infrastructure to 
realize our freely chosen goals. This principle also includes the above men-
tioned moral obligation to help those less fortunate. In addition to being 
morally relevant in this way, we will show that it has legal relevance as well. 
This would justify redistribution via taxation, and other policies of social 
justice, to the extent to which they are means for improving chances of each 
member of a society to in fact live a dignified and free life. We will also show 
that the demand to protect factual freedom of members of a society includes 
the protection of civic dignity, i.e. equal rights of citizens to take part in the 
political life of their society. 
In the next section, we intend to show how Kant’s theory of justice can help 
us accomplish this goal, by recognizing  how the question of factual freedom 
and civic dignities is related to the problem of taxation and social justice  We 
will conclude with a brief critique of Nozick’s and Hayek’s arguments in-
formed by Kant’s theory.
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Kant’s Argument on Taxation
In many points Nozick’s argument about formal principle of freedom is sim-
ilar to the Kantian view of formal justice. Nozick even used Kant’s claim to 
treat others as ends in themselves to defend his own thesis (Nozick 1974: 
32). Taking this into consideration, it could look like the formal principle 
of freedom suffices to protect dignity in a Kantian sense (the possibility to 
choose one’s own ends). Moreover, like Nozick, Kant actually rejects the 
idea that justice can re quire the redistribution of resources in response to 
needs (V-MS/Vigil, AA 27: 517,526), explicitly rejects juridical relevance of 
material inequality (TP, AA 08: 289–290) and “mere” needs and wishes (MS, 
AA 06: 213,230).
However, in Metaphysics of morals Kant is also explicit about the right of the 
state to introduce taxation of the rich:
To the supreme commander (Oberbefehlshaber) there belongs indirectly, 
that is, insofar as he has taken over the duty of the people, the right to im-
pose taxes on the people for its own preservation, such as taxes to support 
organizations providing for the poor, foundling homes, and church organi-
zations, usually called charitable or pious institutions. (MS, AA 06:326)
In his Lectures on Ethics (Moralphilosophie Collins) Kant holds even more egal-
itarian view:
One can participate in the general injustice even if one does no injustice 
according to the civil laws and institutions. Now if one shows benefi-
cence to a wretch, then one has not given him anything gratuitously, but 
has given him only what one had earlier helped to take from him through 
the general injustice. For if no one took more of the goods of life than an-
other, then there would be no rich and no poor. Accordingly, even acts of 
generosity are acts of duty and indebtedness, which arise from the rights 
of others. (V-MO/Collins, AA 27: 416)
For right-libertarians, such as Nozick, these claims contradict justice based 
on the principle of formal freedom. One of the solutions is to understand tax-
ation as founded on the ethical duty toward the other, i.e. as the right of the 
state to enforce duty of benevolence – as claimed by Onora O’Neill (O’Neill 
1989: ch10–12.). However, Kant explicitly rejects both that state could rely 
on voluntary contributions and, more importantly, that enforcement of cur-
rent contributions would be a legal way to satisfy the needs of the poor2, and 
rather argues for legal public taxation (MS, AA 06: 326). As we will argue, 
Kant’s argument is specifically juridical and not (merely) ethical.
2  See Varden 2016.
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Kant’s main argument goes:
The general will of the people has united itself into a society that is to 
maintain itself perpetually; and for this end it has submitted itself to the 
internal authority of the state in order to maintain those members of the 
society who are unable to maintain themselves. For reasons of state the 
government is therefore authorized to constrain the wealthy to provide 
the means of sustenance to those who are unable to provide for even their 
most necessary natural needs. The wealthy have acquired an obligation to 
the commonwealth, since they owe their existence to an act of submitting 
to its protection and care, which they need in order to live; on this obliga-
tion the state now bases its right to contribute what is theirs to maintain-
ing their fellow citizens (MS, AA 06: 326).
As we see, Kant refers to the state right based on a ‘duty of the people’ (Pflicht 
des Volks). The preservation of the people, here in question, is not material 
existence of the state (“for it is rich”), but existence of its members as citizens.
Selbständigkeit, factual freedom and civic diginity
Kant characterizes citizens of the state with three main attributes:
The members of such a society who are united for giving law (societas ci-
vilis), that is, the members of a state, are called citizens of a state (cives). In 
terms of rights, the attributes of a citizen, inseparable from his essence (as 
a citizen), are: lawful freedom, the attribute of obeying no other law than 
that to which he has given his consent; civil equality, that of not recogniz-
ing among the people any superior with the moral capacity to bind him as 
a matter of Right in a way that he could not in turn bind the other; and 
third, the attribute of civil self-subsistence, of owing his existence and pres-
ervation to his own rights and powers as a member of the commonwealth, 
not to the choice of another among the people. From his self-subsistence 
follows his civil personality, his attribute of not needing to be represented 
by another where rights are concerned (MS, AA 06: 314).
The most controversial of them is the attribute of self-subsistence (Selbstän-
digkeit), not owning one’s existence to the choice of other people. Unlike the 
first two attributes, self-subsistence is connected with factual (material) sit-
uation. Kant gives us varieties of examples, including servants, a minor (nat-
uraliter vel civiliter), controversially all women, but also some explicit exam-
ples of economic organizations of society: “the blacksmith in India, who goes 
into people’s houses to work on iron with his hammer, anvil, and bellows, 
as compared with the European carpenter or blacksmith who can put the 
products of his work up as goods for sale to the public; the private tutor, as 
compared with the schoolteacher; the tenant farmer as compared with the 
leasehold farmer, and so forth“ (MS, AA 06: 314–315). In a word “anyone 
whose preservation in existence (his being fed and protected) depends not on 
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his management of his own business but on arrangements made by another 
(except the state)“ (ibid). Though many of Kant’s claims here could be taken as 
dubious and politically incorrect3, it is important that he acknowledges the 
fact that status of the (active) citizen of the state could be violated by some 
material aspects of that person’s life, e.g. by an infringement on her factual 
freedom – as it is the case with economic dependence on another person. 
Implications of these claims are also controversial. Kant uses them to intro-
duce a distinction well known from the French post-revolutionary Consti-
tution, between active and passive citizens. On the one hand, Kant, as the 
old French Constitution, claims that those who lack (above all) economic 
self-subsistence are passive citizens, enjoying the protection of the state, but 
lacking rights to vote and participate in other public political decision-mak-
ing. From this point of view, it could seem that Kant is only an old-fashioned 
theorist who promotes the unacceptable idea that some citizens should be 
deprived of their basic political right to vote. On the other hand, although 
Kant accepts that one could naturally or voluntary lose the status of an ac-
tive citizen, he insists that there must be rightful conditions for everyone to 
become an active citizen:
It follows only that, whatever sort of positive laws the citizens might vote 
for, these laws must still not be contrary to the natural laws of freedom 
and of the equality of everyone in the people corresponding to this free-
dom, namely that anyone can work his way up from this passive condition 
to an active one. (MS, AA 06: 315) 
Kant’s weak claim „that anyone can work his way up from this passive condi-
tion to an active one” could certainly not be used to defend egalitarian view 
of a society, nor the premise “to everyone according to their needs”. How-
ever, it could be used as a strong argument in favour of some social policies, 
which are today in danger; for example, public health and social insurance, 
free public education, etc (Shell 2016). 
To sum up this part of the text, Kant had recognized the dependence of per-
son’s possibility to be an active participant of political life from economi-
cal and factual situation. What is here at stake are not only basic needs, nor 
3  Alessandro Pinzani and Nuria Sánchez Madrid listed three key limitations of Kant’s 
account of passive citizenship. 1) They found Kant’s argu ment that the poor should not 
vote, because they would sell their votes, double-edged – for the same argument could 
be used against the rich (buyers), and it was used for ostracism in Ancient Athens. 2) Kant 
addresses formal obstacles to attaining full active citizenship, while (intentionally or not) 
economic privileges and inequalities are left out of consideration. 3) Kant is very insen-
sitive to the gender issue, for he finds that a woman renounces her civil independence by 
entering into marriage. (Pinzani, Madrid 2016)
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universal human rights, but rather civic dignities.4 Civic dignity implies equal 
rights to possibilities to take part in political decision-making, i.e. to become 
an active citizen of the state. Kant acknowledges that those rights could be 
affected through the material limits, limits of one’s factual freedom, caused by 
dependence of their material existence from someone else. Although Kant’s 
ethics certainly implies duties toward the other, to help others who are in 
trouble, the obligation implied by argument about self-subsistence of citi-
zens is not reducible to (mere) ethical duties and, as we will see in the next 
part of the text, is connected with juridical questions and rights of the state.
General will, civil union and society
Kant makes a distinction between society and civil union:
The civil union (unio civilis) cannot well be called a society [Gesellschaft]; 
because between the commander (imperans) and the subject (subditus) there 
is no partnership (Mitgenossenschaft). They are not social fellows [Gesel-
len]; rather, one is subordinated to, not coordinated with, the other, and be-
ing co-ordinated with one another must regard themselves as equals in-
asmuch as they stand under the same common laws. It is thus less the case 
that this union [Verein] is a society than that makes one. (AA 06: 306 –307)
It is important to notice that civil society, thus, is not simple uniting of people 
who live in a same place, but, as previous quotation suggests, a society which 
has been made by a civil union, a society of active citizens living at equal as 
lawgivers, whose dignity is founded on public laws of the state. Kant refers 
to civil society both in the argument about taxation (“The general will of the 
people has united itself into a society”) and in the argument about self-sub-
sistence of citizens (“The members of such a society who are united for giv-
ing law (societas civilis)”). 
It is now clear that “preservation”, previously mentioned in an argument 
about taxation, is not material preservation of the state, nor of existence of 
its members, but preservation of the civil society, which would be corrupted 
if the members of the state lose their active role in a society. Moreover, this 
right, according to Kant, belongs to the dignities of the state:
Every state contains three authorities within it, that is, the general unit-
ed will consists of three persons (trias politica): the sovereign authority 
[Herrschergewalt] (sovereignty) in the person of the legislator; the executive 
authority in the person of the ruler (in conformity to law); and the judicial 
authority (to award to each what is his in accordance with the law) in the 
person of the judge (potestas legislatoria, rectoria et iudiciaria). (AA 06: 313)
4  This term was introduced by Josiah Ober. He distinguishes civic dignity, as defined 
above, from universal human dignity and aristocratic or elitist dignity related to the 
social statuses and ranks (Ober 2012)
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All of those authorities in the state are dignities (Würden), since they arise 
necessarily from the Idea of a state as such, as essential for the establishment 
(constitution) of it, they are dignities of the state (Staatswürden) (AA06: 315)
The legislative authority can belong only to the united will of the people. 
(AA06: 313)
With this, Kant’s juridical argument about taxation and social policies is com-
pleted: the infringement on the factual (material) freedom of the people, if it 
happens that they become poor, implies that they will lose their active sta-
tus in society and if people lose possibilities to become active members of 
society, civil society would become corrupted, thus the state has the right to 
impose taxes to enable those in a passive status to became active members of 
the society for the preservation of the civil society. But, there is also an ad-
ditional argument, mentioned above, that probably could imply even more 
egalitarian consequences. Those who are rich are dependent on civil society 
in at least two ways: they owe their protection to the civil society, to the pub-
lic laws, that regulate this society; and they owe to the society, because they 
became rich only in and with the help of the society (which protects trade 
rules, property, encourages others to cooperate inside its institutions, etc.)
The main difference between Nozick and Kant is, therefore, that for Kant 
things in some way change with the transition from private rights (in a state 
of nature) to the public rights (“the sum of the laws which need to be pro-
mulgated generally in order to bring about a rightful condition“, AA 06: 311). 
Although, both private and public rights for Kant have the same content, and 
only the form changes, this change presupposes united lawgiving will. But 
here, the reasoning is not merely private, laws must actually be based on the 
public reasoning, and must protect public reasoning, which includes pro-
tection of rightful conditions for everyone to take part in the civil society. 
And this presupposes much more than just the formal principle of freedom, 
including the protection of factual freedom; as Shell wrote:
As member of the general will, in other words, each wills his own existence 
as citizen only insofar as he also, and equally, wills the civic existence of 
every other member of the peo ple (Shell 2016: 8)
We do not want here to discuss which view of society is ultimately better, 
but argument showed above indicates that Nozick does not actually defend 
(factual) freedom of all in the society, but the capitalist view of the society. 
Geral Cohen came to the same conclusion:
Therefore Nozick cannot claim to be inspired throughout by a desire to 
protect freedom, unless he means by ‘freedom’ what he really does mean 
by it: the freedom of private property owners to do as they wish with their 
property. (Cohen 1995: 90)
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From the Kantian perspective, protection of person’s freedom under the pub-
lic laws would imply much more than just the formal principle of freedom. 
It would demand the protection of factual freedom, e.g. through the relief 
of poverty. Thus it looks like freedom as understood by Nozick would for 
Kant still count as lawless freedom:
And one cannot say: a state, a man in state has sacrificed a part of his own 
innate outer freedom for the sake of an end, but rather, he has relinquished 
entirely his wild, lawless freedom in order to find his freedom as such un-
diminished, in a dependence upon laws, that is, in a rightful condition, 
since this dependence arises from his own lawgiving will. (AA 06: 316)
Based on everything said above, let us dispose with Hayek’s arguments as 
well.
First of all, Hayek’s ontological argument, seems to us unconvincing because 
we can in fact attribute some responsibility for a particular distribution of 
wealth in the society to the institutions deciding on policies which are to 
be adopted. Therefore, we have responsibility as a political community for 
the particular distribution of wealth being just or unjust, because we adopt-
ed certain policies leading to such distribution.In the light of developments 
within social thoery in the last tree decades, Hayek’s ontological position 
seems rather naïve. There has been a significant effort lately to explain and 
understand various collective social institutuions and their intentionality.5 
As for Hayek’s epistemological argument, he himself conceded that we can 
in fact have some knowledge at least regarding the minimal needs, for ex-
ample shelter, clothing and food. There is no reason why we couldn’t extend 
this even further, to encompass needs that are easily recognized as univer-
sally desirable: education, health care, sanitation, access to information, etc. 
Moreover, some of them directly follow from the political and economical 
organization of a society and enable the possibilities of factual freedom (for 
example, the need to use transport to go to or to find a job, or the need to use 
internet to access information).6 The problem remains of course, where to 
draw the line. But the issue does not really confronts us with an impossible 
epistemological task described by Hayek (unless we set the task too strin-
gently, demanding e.g. establishment of some perfectly egalitarian society). 
Social needs are many and changing, but that does not mean that they can-
not be an object of knowledge for the social sciences.    
As for Hayek’s economic argument, we will not dwell upon it, but we do 
think that he overestimates the dangers for the economy that policies of 
5  See Tuomela 2007; Searle 1995, 2010; Gilbert 1989.
6  See Geuss 1981: 22.
283
SOCIAL JUSTICE: NEW PERSPECTIVES, NEW HORIZONS 
social justice can bring. There are theories that show the benefits of alterna-
tive economic models, as well as the perils of the neoliberal one. The success 
of neoliberal policies in the second half of XX century was followed by the 
serious economic crises in the beginning of the XXI century, indicating that 
neoliberal economy might not be a solution to all our problems.7
Finally, Hayek’s political argument is at least double-edged, for, as we saw 
above in Kant’s defence of social policies, and as we can see in the world to-
day, if the factual freedom of people is in danger, members of the society 
could easily lose their possibilities to actively take part in a political deci-
sion-making, leaving the doors wide open for oligarchy. 
Concluding Remarks
We tried to show that we need something more that the formal principle of 
freedom to make our society free. If the basic fact of human life and human 
freedom is something that we should build our society on, then we think 
that in formulating the principles of a free society, we need to be careful not 
to underestimate the lived experience of freedom and the facticity of life. 
The principle of respect for human life and dignity (civic dignities included), 
which is not blind to the problem of factual freedom, gives us very strong rea-
son to defend social policies. This principle enables freedom itself to be more 
generally dispersed than if we stick only to the formal principle of freedom.
Following this line of argument, the social policies can be defended, via the 
principle of human dignity and respect, as moral obligations, as a duty of 
beneficence which could be institutionalized by the state. In addition, and 
this is often omitted from the story, they can also be defended juridically 
via civic dignity. 
The importance of questions presented here is even greater because today 
we witness the worldwide degradation of social policies which enable pro-
tection of the minimum of factual freedom, such as universal healthcare, 
free public education, social insurance, the right to fair working conditions, 
poverty relief, and many more. 
References:
Alexy, Robert (2002), A Theory of Constitutional Rights, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Berlin, Isaiah (2002), “Two Concepts of Liberty” in H. Hardy (ed.), Liberty, Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 166–217.
Cohen, Gerald A. (1995), Self-ownership Freedom and Equality, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press
Gilbert, Margaret (1989), On Social Facts, London and New York: Routledge.
7  see McNally 1993
284
SOCIAL JUSTICE AND THE FORmAL PRINCIPLE OF FREEDOmOlga NikOlić, igOr Cvejić
Hayek, Friedrich (2013), Law, Legislation and Liberty, London and New York: Routledge.
Nozick, Robert (1974), Anarchy, State, and Utopia, Oxford: Blackwell.
Mill, John Stuart (2003), On Liberty, New Haven and London: Yale University Press.
Ober, Josiah (2012), “Democracy’s Dignity”, American Political Science Review 106 (4): 
827–846.
O’Neill, Onora (1989), Constructions of Reason. Explorations on Kant’s Practical Philosophy, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
Pinzani, Alessandro; Madrid, Nuria Sánchez, “The State Looks Down: Some 
Reassessments of Kant’s Appraisal of Citizenship“, in: A. Faggion, A. Pinzani, N.S. 
Madrid (ed.), Kant and Social Policies, Cham: Palgrave McMillan: 25–48.
Searle, John (1995), The Construction of Social Reality, London: Penguin
Searle, John (2010), Making the Social World: The Structure of Human Civilization, Oxford: 
Oxford University Press
Shell, Susan Meld, “Kant on Citizenship, Society and Redistributive Justice”, in: A. 
Faggion, A. Pinzani, N.S. Madrid (ed.), Kant and Social Policies, Cham: Palgrave 
McMillan: 1–24.
Tebble, Adam James (2009), “Hayek and Social Justice: A Critique”, Critical Review of 
International Social and Political Philosophy 12 (4): 581–604.
Toumela, Raimo (2007), The Philosophy of Sociality: The Shared Point of View, Oxford: 
Oxford University Press
Varden, Helga (2016), “Rawls vs Nozick vs Kant on Domestic Economic Justice”, in: A. 
Faggion, A. Pinzani, N.S. Madrid (ed.), Kant and Social Policies, Cham: Palgrave 
McMillan: 93–124.
Olga Nikolić, Igor Cvejić
Socijalna pravda i formalni princip slobode
Apstrakt
Cilj ovog teksta je da pokaže, nasuprot desno-libertarijanskoj kritici socijalne 
pravde, da postoje dobri razlozi za odbranu politika socijalne pravde unutar slo-
bodnog društva. U prvom delu rada, predstavićemo dve uticajne desno-liberta-
rijanske kritike socijalne pravde, izložene u knjigama Pravo, zakonodavstvo i slo-
boda Fridriha Hajeka i Anarhija, država i utopija Roberta Nozika. Na osnovu njihovog 
pristupa, politike socijalne pravde vide se kao neopravdana povreda slobode 
pojedinačnih članova društva. U odgovoru na ovu kritiku, uvešćemo distinkciju 
između formalne i faktičke slobode i tvrdićemo da formalni princip slobode koji 
brane Hajek i Nozik nije dovoljan za zaštitu faktičke slobode članova društva, jer 
ne prepoznaje (1) moralnu obligaciju da se pomogne onima kojima, bez njihove 
krivice, u velikoj meri nedostaje faktička sloboda, i (2) pravnu obligaciju države 
da zaštiti građansko dostojanstvo svih članova društva. U drugom delu teksta, 
nudimo interpretaciju Kantovog argumenta o porezima, prema kom građansko 
dostojanstvo pretpostavlja faktičku slobodu, da bismo tvrdili da Kantovo oprav-
danje poreza daje dobre razloge da se tvrdi da država ima pravnu obligaciju da 
zaštiti faktičku slobodu politikama socijalne pravde.
Ključne reči: socijalna pravda, socijalna politika, porez, sloboda, dostojanstvo, 
Hajek, Nozik, Kant.
